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OMNIPOTENCE AND THE POWER TO CHOOSE: 
A REPLY TO WIELENBERG 
Wes Morriston 
Erik Wielenberg has recently proposed a novel definition of omnipotence. 
One of the virtues of Wielenberg's analysis is supposed to be that it makes 
omnipotence compatible with essential goodness. In the present paper, I 
try to show that Wielenberg does not succeed in reconciling omnipotence 
with essential goodness. Even if there is a conditional sense in which God 
has the "power" to do things he cannot choose to do, the fact that he cannot 
choose to do them shows that his basic power of choice is limited in a way 
that is incompatible with omnipotence. 
In recent years, definitions of omnipotence have become more and more 
complicated. Indeed, they frequently employ so much technical apparatus 
and contain so many subordinate clauses and qualifications, that it is nat-
ural to wonder whether they have much to do with what an ordinary per-
son might mean by saying that God is all-powerful. A refreshingly differ-
ent approach is taken by Erik Wielenberg/ who proposes the following 
succinct definition. 
(02) x is omnipotent if and only if it is not the case that there is some 
state of affairs, p, such that x is unable to bring about p at least partial-
ly because of a lack of power in x.2 
Before jumping to the conclusion that God is not omnipotent because he 
can't bring about some state of affairs, (02) instructs us to ask why God 
cannot bring it about. Is it (at least partly) because of some lack of power 
in God? If so, then (02) tells us that God is not omnipotent. But if it is 
entirely due to some other factor, then we have not succeeded in specifying 
a possible power that God lacks. 
To see how this is supposed to work for obvious impossibilities, 
Wielenberg considers the case of the round square. No reasonable defini-
tion of omnipotence would entail that God is not omnipotent if he is 
unable to create a round square. (02) handles this kind of case quite easi-
ly, since God's inability to produce such things is wholly explained by the 
fact that they are metaphysically impossible - and not even partly by a lack 
of power in God. No one, no matter how powerful, could create a round 
square. So the fact that God cannot create one does nothing to show that 
he is not omnipotent. 
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But there are other, more difficult cases to consider, and it is one of these 
that will be the subject of this paper. Like many other philosophers trying 
to understand omnipotence, Wielenberg is working under certain theologi-
cal constraints. Since it is widely believed that God is essentially good, 
Wielenberg thinks he must explain why even an omnipotent God could 
not break his promises or cause innocent persons to suffer for no reason. 
Following Wielenberg, we can present the problem in terms of the follow-
ing examples. 
(ef) The earth is laid to waste by a flood. 3 
(ic) An innocent child is tortured for one thousand years.4 
There doesn't seem to be anything metaphysically impossible about (ef) or 
(ic). But if God is essentially good, it is impossible for him to bring about 
either of them. If he were to bring about (ef), he would be breaking his 
promise to Noah. If he were to bring about (ic), he would be doing some-
thing that (to use Wielenberg's expression) is "essentially evil" - something 
"so intrinsically bad that necessarily, it is morally wrong for any being to 
bring [it] about."s 
Here, too, Wielenberg thinks that (02) does the job. The reason why 
God cannot break his promise not to bring on another flood, and cannot 
make an innocent child suffer for a thousand years is not that God is lack-
ing in power. It is rather because he has "the highest possible degree of a 
certain property - moral goodness." 6 Consequently, Wielenberg thinks 
(02) gives us the result we want. Under (02), the fact that God cannot 
bring about (ef) or (ic) is perfectly consistent with omnipotence. 
There is, however, an obvious objection to this analysis that Wielenberg 
does not consider - one that will be the principal focus of the present 
paper.7 It goes like this. 
Even if it is true that God does not lack the power to bring about (ef) or 
(ic), the fact remains that he cannot exercise this power. True enough, he 
cannot bring about (ef) or (ic) because he is essentially and perfectly good. 
But part of what that means is that there is something else that he cannot 
do - he cannot choose to bring about states of affairs like these. It follows -
doesn't it? - that God's power of choice is limited in a certain way. How 
can that be consistent with omnipotence? 
To defeat this objection, Wielenberg would need to show, not merely 
that God's essential goodness does not entail a deficiency in his power to 
bring about (ef) or (ic), but that it entails no deficiency in his power to 
choose. In order to assess the prospects for pulling this off, we need to dig 
a bit deeper. Two questions merit further exploration. (1) What do we 
mean by "power" in the present context? (2) How, exactly, is God's essen-
tial goodness supposed to "explain" his inability to make evil choices? 
Wielenberg doesn't offer a general analysis of power. He says merely 
that there are "many different kinds of power that a being might have."" 
Wielenberg distinguishes three types of power: (i) physical power (the 
power to lift weights, for example); (ii) mental power or intelligence; and 
(iii) what Wielenberg (rather oddly) calls "willpower." By "willpower", 
Wielenberg does not mean the power to make hard choices and stick to 
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them, or anything of that sort. He defines it rather as "a capacity for mak-
ing things happen simply by willing them to happen." The willpower of 
humans is obviously quite limited. God's willpower, by contrast, extends 
to the entire universe. "He can create and destroy through the sheer force 
of His will."9 
The power to make choices does not seem to fit neatly into any of these 
categories. Obviously it isn't a matter of having a "physical power" like 
the power to lift weights. What about "mental power?" Well, certainly, 
making a choice is a mental act of a certain kind. But that tells us nothing 
about what it is to have the power to perform such acts. And in any case, 
the power to make choices isn't what Wielenberg has in mind by "mental 
power," since he equates the latter with intelligence. 
That leaves us with "willpower." But the power to make choices doesn't 
fit neatly into this category either. We don't have to make choices by making 
other choices - we just make them. We don't have to make them by doing 
some further act of "willing them to happen." Choosing is willing. lO 
The following pair of distinctions may help us sort things out. First, let 
us distinguish between those actions that we perform by doing other acts, 
and those that we just do. When I throw a rock into a lake, I do so by mov-
ing hand and arm. I move hand and arm by flexing my muscles, and so on 
... It is plausible to suppose that this series of embedded acts must have a 
first member - something that I just do, a basic act that I do not do by doing 
something else. 
Very often, at least, this first act consists in what might be called "the 
forming of an executive intention" or (less grandiosely) "undertaking to 
perform an action of a certain sort." This basic act may, or may not be, the 
upshot of deliberation. The agent's motives and reasons (if any) may, or 
may not, be causally sufficient for the agent's intention. Either way, the 
forming of this intention is a basic act of the agent - one that she does not 
do by doing any other act. 
With this familiar picture in mind, we can also distinguish between 
what I shall call "basic" and "conditional" power. Basic power is the not-
further-analyzable power to perform basic acts. It includes the power to 
form intentions, to will that something (else) happen, to make choices "by" 
just making them. 
Conditional power, on the other hand, has to do with the efficacy of one's 
will. A person exercises his conditional power when he does one thing by 
doing another. At a department meeting, for example, I have the conditional 
power to signal my desire to speak. if I choose to do so by raising my hand, I 
will succeed in communicating this desire to others by raising my hand. 
But what about the power to choose to raise my hand? This power can 
hardly be analyzed as "if I choose to choose to raise my hand, then I will 
choose to raise my hand." My power to choose to raise my hand - to form 
the relevant intention - is not a conditional, but a basic power. 
How are conditional power and basic power related? Does conditional 
power always presuppose basic power? Or is it possible for a person to 
have the conditional power to do something even though she does not 
have the power to choose to do it? I think this is possible. For example, a 
person with an irrational aversion to dogs may be unable to bring herself 
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to choose one as a pet. But, as I am using this expression, she still has the 
conditional power to go to the humane society and bring home a dog. If 
she were to choose to do so, she would succeed. 
On standard theological assumptions, then, God's inability to bring 
about (ef) and (ic) is not due to a deficiency in conditional power. God, we 
may suppose, has the maximum possible amount of this kind of power. If, 
per impossible, he chose to bring on another flood or to torture an innocent 
child for a thousand years, he would succeed in doing SO.l1 The fact that 
God cannot bring about (ef) or (ic) is due, not to a lack of conditional 
power, but to the fact that he is by nature so perfectly good that he cannot 
bring himself to exercise his conditional power in these ways. He simply 
cannot bring himself to perform the required basic actions. He cannot 
choose to break his promises or to bring about an "essentially immoral" 
states of affairs. 
What kinds and amounts of power are required for omnipotence? I do 
not have a precise answer, but I think it is at least clear that no amount of 
merely conditional power can be sufficient. To see why, imagine a being-
call her Jill - who has unlimited conditional power, but who cannot bring 
herself to exercise it in any significant way. She would succeed at anything 
she tried. But she suffers from a kind of mental paralysis. She simply can-
not bring herself to make the necessary choices. 
Do we need to know more in order to know that Jill is not omnipotent? 
There is a certau, power over herself that she lacks. Since her basic power of 
choice is so terribly limited, we can easily conceive of a being having all of 
Jill's conditional power plus a wide-ranging basic power of choice. All 
things considered, such a being would be far more powerful than Jill. 
Since Jill does not have the maximum conceivable amount of power, it fol-
lows that she is not omnipotent. 
I think Wielenberg would disagree with me about this. At one point, he 
considers an example in which a series of otherwise maximally powerful 
"deities" are by nature "color-impaired" in such a way that they cannot 
bring about the following state of affairs: 
(ro) There exists a red object. 12 
According to Wielenberg, this is not sufficient to show that the deities are 
not omnipotent. We must first ask why they cannot bring about (ro). If 
their inability is due to a lack of "willpower" - if, no matter how hard they 
concentrate on (ro) and "will" that it obtain, "nothing happens" - then they 
are not omnipotent. But if their inability is due only to the fact that they 
are not "acquainted" with certain colors, then Wielenberg declares that 
they are omnipotent. 
After all, if each deity in the series really is powerful enough to create 
any object, then each deity in the series really is omnipotent, despite 
his various limitations.13 
To back up this judgment, Wielenberg appeals to another imaginary 
example. Consider a strongman named "Hercules" who is strong enough 
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to lift objects of any weight. No one, no matter how strong, could lift a 
heavier weight. Wielenberg asks us to imagine "a series of beings like 
Hercules - that is, beings such that necessarily, no being is stronger." 
However, each member of this series suffers from "a strange psychological 
condition." Each is "terrified of any object over a certain weight." And in 
the case of each strongman, this psychological condition is so "severe" that 
he "is unable to be in the same room with, much less actually lift, an object 
over a certain weight." Despite the fact that some of the beings can bring 
themselves to lift weights heavier than those that others can bring them-
selves to lift, Wielenberg thinks we should say that the beings are all 
"equally strong." From this he draws the following lesson: 
I think the case is much the same with the series of deities. Each is 
equally powerful, despite the extreme variance in the kinds of objects 
that each can in fact create. And each is omnipotent.14 
Surely something has gone wrong here? If the imagined deities are gen-
uinely omnipotent, then it seems to me that they ought to be able to exer-
cise their power to create red objects. If their lack of acquaintance with the 
color red makes it impossible for them to do so, then their ignorance elimi-
nates a certain power - not the conditional power to create a red object, 
perhaps, but the basic power to choose to do so. 
In this regard, Wielenberg's analogy with physical strength is quite mis-
leading. There is, of course, an obvious sense in which the terrified 
weightlifters are all maximally "strong." But they are not equally powerful, 
precisely because the basic power of choice is more limited in those with 
lower terror thresholds. And because of the way in which each of them is 
ruled by his terror, we don't need to know anything else about them in 
order to know that none of them could be omnipotent. 
So I think Wielenberg draws the wrong lesson from the example of the 
strongmen. What this example does help us to see is that maximal condi-
tional power is not sufficient for maximal power overall. And since the lat-
ter is required for omnipotence, Wielenberg is also quite wrong about the 
series of color-impaired deities. Even if their inability to create red objects 
is due to their lack of acquaintance with the color red, and even if they 
have maximal conditional power, it does not follow that they have maximal 
power overall. Basic power matters too. 
What, then, of God's inability to choose to make an innocent child suffer 
for a thousand years? I would say that if God cannot choose bring about 
such things, then his basic power is limited in such a way that he does not 
have maximal power overall. 
We cannot avoid this conclusion by appealing to God's unlimited condi-
tional power. To have the basic power to do something is to be able to 
exercise that power directly. It would be absurd to defend the claim that 
God has the basic power to choose to bring about (ic), by saying that ifhe 
chose to choose it, he would succeed in choosing it. 
Even so, Wielenberg may want to argue that since God's inability to 
choose "essentially evil" states of affairs is due to his essential goodness, it is 
not due to a lack of power. But this is much too quick. Wielenberg's oppo-
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nent claims that essential goodness limits God's power to choose. It is plain-
ly not adequate to reply that essential goodness does not limit God's power 
because it (and not a lack of power) is what explains God's inability to bring 
about evil. Lack of power can always be explained in other terms. Why 
can't I fly like a bird? Because I have a certain kind of body, and because the 
laws of physics are as they are. These facts - which can be described without 
reference to any lack of power in me - fully explain the fact that I cannot fly. 
But they also show - don't they? - that I do not have the power to fly. So 
before concluding that essential goodness does not limit God's power, I 
think we need to consider the situation much more carefully. 
This brings us to the second of the two questions I said we needed to 
address. How, exactly, is God's essential goodness supposed to "explain" 
his inability to make evil choices? Perhaps the answer goes like this. In 
every possible world, God's moral character - his commitment to the good 
and his aversion to evil- is so strong that it causes him, always and every-
where, to choose the good. He cannot choose evil because he has no 
desires that are in competition with his preference for the good. He cannot 
even be tempted to choose evil. 
On this picture, God's choice of the good is wholly determined by his 
character - by his deepest desires and values. And since God's moral char-
acter is one aspect of his nature or essence, he cannot change it. That is 
why no choice incompatible with his perfect moral character is even possi-
ble for him. 
Let's suppose that this is right. Suppose that God's perfectly good 
nature, and nothing else, is what prevents him from choosing to bring 
about (cf) or (ic). Why doesn't that simply show that God is by nature lim-
ited in basic power? To help us decide, I suggest that we consult our intu-
itions about the following simple thought experiment. 
Imagine a being - call him Jack - who has just as much conditional 
power as God. But Jack, unlike God, is essentially evil. In every possible 
world, Jack's moral character - his commitment to evil and his aversion to 
the good - is so strong that it causes him, always and everywhere, to 
choose evil. He cannot choose the good because he has no desires that are 
in competition with his preference for evil. He cannot even be tempted to 
choose the good. Jack enjoys the suffering of innocent children, and cannot 
abide the happiness of the virtuous. So he has no trouble choosing to bring 
about the likes of (ic). What Jack has a problem with is states of affairs like: 
(rp) A righteous person lives in great happiness for a thousand years. 
It is true, of course, that if Jack chose to bring about (rp), he would succeed 
in doing so. But Jack is so evil that he cannot bring himself to make such 
choices. 
As far as I can see, Jack is not less powerful than Wielenberg supposes 
God to be. He has as much conditional power as God has. He also seems to 
have just as much basic power. It is true that Jack lacks the power to alter 
his (bad) character. But God also lacks the power to alter his (good) char-
acter. It seems to me, therefore, that God is omnipotent only if Jack is. 
Is Jack omnipotent? I wouldn't say so. It is true that his evil choices are 
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wholly determined by his character - by his deepest desires and values. 
That is why he cannot choose to bring about (rp). But this doesn't show 
that he is not lacking in power. On the contrary, it seems to me that Jack is 
a slave to his own evil character - that he is wholly subject to evil desires 
and inclinations he is powerless to control (though admittedly he does not 
want to control them). 
A final thought experiment will serve to back up my judgment that 
Wielenberg's Cod has less than the maximum conceivable amount of 
power. Imagine another being - call her Joan - who has just as much con-
ditional power as God or Jack. If Joan chooses to bring something about, 
she succeeds. The difference is that Joan's basic power is not limited by the 
requirements of either an essentially good or an essentially evil character. 
Unlike God, Joan has the power to choose to bring about (ic). And unlike 
Jack, she has the power to choose to bring about (rp). 
Although I might prefer to have God (and not Joan) in charge of the uni-
verse, my intuition is that Joan has more basic power - and is therefore 
more powerful overall - than either God or Jack. If this is right, then the 
limitations imposed by essential goodness and essential evil are genuine 
limitations on basic power. God might be better or greater because he can-
not make evil choices - but the fact remains that he is less powerful than he 
would be if he were able to do SO.15 
Thus far, I have been assuming that basic power is something that one 
can have more, or less, of. If I can choose to do A and can also choose not 
to do A, then I have (in that respect) more basic power than I do if I can 
choose to do A but cannot choose not to do A. By this I do not mean that 
there is a separate "power" of choice for each thing one might choose. 
There may, for all I know, be just one basic power of choice - I claim only 
that this power may be more or less limited. 
But even this claim may be challenged in the following way. Someone 
might agree with Descartes' claim that the power of will is indivisible - the 
same in God and in creaturely persons. On this view, one's "will" is the 
all-or-nothing power to affirm or deny a proposition, and to say yes or no 
to a proposed course of action. You either have this power or you don't. If 
Descartes were right about this, then it might seem that there is only one 
possible degree of basic power, in which case it would follow that God 
does not have less basic power than Joan. 
I think it would be a mistake to draw any such conclusion. How much 
basic power you have is not only determined by how much of the faculty 
of "will" you have or even by how "strong" your will is. It is also deter-
mined by what you can apply it to. If, for example, you are completely 
ignorant of predicate logic, you cannot "choose" to prove (or not to prove) 
Completeness Theorem. And even if you are not ignorant of predicate 
logic, you will still be unable to make this choice if (like some undergradu-
ate students) you have an irrational aversion to this type of reasoning. In 
either case, I would say, your basic power is limited in scope. Your will 
may be as complete or as "strong" as you please, but your basic power is 
no greater (in scope) than your ability to apply it to different possibilities. 
So I remain convinced that Jack would be just as powerful overall as an 
essentially good being could be, and that Joan would be more powerful 
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overall than such a being could be. If this is right, then essential goodness 
is not compatible with omnipotence. 
Some philosophers may not accept an argument based on imaginary 
examples like the ones [ have been working with. They may insist that, 
since God exists and is omnipotent and perfectly good in every possible 
world, no such beings as Joan or Jack are "metaphysically possible."16 My 
own take on this is that, for purposes of analyzing the concept of omnipo-
tence, the bare conceptual possibility of these examples is quite sufficient. If 
we can conceive of these "possibilities" without inconsistency or other 
obvious absurdity, then our intuitions about them should be taken serious-
lyY (In any case, I do not think that Wielenberg could consistently dis-
agree with me about this. For as we have seen, his arguments rely heavily 
on imaginary examples that are every bit as likely to be "metaphysically 
impossible" as any that I have floated.) 
Even if the relevance of my thought experiments is conceded, I do not 
expect everyone to share my intuitions about them. The history of 
Christian philosophy is chock full of thinkers who link the concepts of 
power and goodness in a way that would (if correct) suggest a view of 
these imaginary cases that is very different from mine. Since these philoso-
phers think that the ability to choose evil is a sign of impotence, and not of 
power, they would rank God ahead of Jack and Joan in the power scale. 
This sort of view is well expressed by Anselm in the following passage, 
taken from his Prosiogillln: 
... [W]hen someone is said to have the 'power' of doing or suffering 
something which is not to his advantage or which he ought not to do, 
then by 'power' here we mean 'impotence', for the more he has this 
'power', the more adversity and perversity have power over him 
and the more is he powerless against them. Therefore, Lord God, 
You are the more truly omnipotent since You can do nothing through 
impotence and nothing can have power against YOU. i8 
On this view, the "ability" to change God's moral nature, or to make 
choices that are incompatible with his perfect goodness would not be a 
genuine power. More generally, to be "able" to do something that one 
knows one ought not to do is not any sort of power, but only "perversi-
ty" and "impotence." It is to have a weak character, one that cannot 
stand up to rogue desires and inclinations that run contrary to what one 
knows one ought to do. 
The underlying assumption here seems to be that there is only one way 
in which God could choose to bring about a state of affairs that he knows 
he ought not to bring about. If he were subject to irrational or immoral 
inclinations, these might outweigh his deep will and cause him to choose 
evil. 
On this view of the relation between goodness and power, the "ability" 
to make evil choices is not a power, but a liability. One's basic power can-
not therefore include the "ability" to make choices that are irrational or 
immoral, because there is no such power. So far from being required for 
maximal power, such liability is utterly incompatible with omnipotence. 
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The implications for our "power ranking" of Jack, Joan, and God are as 
follows. Jack (the essentially evil being) would still be a relatively weak 
person because he cannot bring himself to what he ought. But Joan (whose 
basic power supposedly included the ability to choose either good or evil) 
would have impaired basic power because of her ability to make evil 
choices. To the degree that she is able to choose evil, she is subject to irra-
tional influences that are incompatible with maximal power. Both Jack and 
Joan would have a significantly lower degree of basic power than God has 
(assuming that God is essentially good). 
At this juncture, our discussion of omnipotence intersects with tradi-
tional controversies about weakness of will, and about free will and deter-
minism. The resolution of those issues is beyond the scope of this short 
paper. For present purposes it will be sufficient to point out that this way 
of viewing the connection between goodness and power is utterly incom-
patible with the view of moral freedom that Wielenberg seems to hold, since 
he explicitly tries to show that his analysis of omnipotence makes room for 
the sort of incompatibilist libertarian freedom presupposed by the free will 
defense.19 Let me explain. 
Free will defenders generally hold that God has endowed some of his 
creatures with moral freedom, where this is understood as the two-way 
power to choose between good and evil. These creatures have the power, 
not only to choose what they know to be good, but also to choose what 
they know to be evil. If the latter is not a genuine power, but a mere liabili-
ty, then it is hard to see why anyone would think that moral freedom is 
good gift, and not a curse. 
So I think that those who believe in moral freedom in the strong libertar-
ian sense required by the free will defense will probably have to concede 
that a person who can choose both good and evil has greater basic power 
of choice than one who can choose only what he knows to be good. But in 
that case, a maximally powerful being, such as God is usually supposed to 
be, cannot be essentially good. 
I have argued that maximal conditional power is not sufficient for maxi-
mal power overall, and that maximal power overall presupposes a much 
more wide-ranging basic power of choice than is allowed for by the doc-
trine of essential goodness. If this is right, then Wielenberg's definition of 
omnipotence does not have one of the virtues that he claims for it - it does 
not give us an easy way of reconciling omnipotence with essential good-
ness. This may not be fatal to Wielenberg's definition, since it would obvi-
ously be open to him to jettison the doctrine that God is both omnipotent 
and essentially good. But one way or the other, something has to go. 
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